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THE INFLUENCE OF EX PARTE QUIRIN AND 
COURTS-MARTIAL ON MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS 
Morris D. Davis* 
Professor Greg McNeal was an academic consultant to the prosecution 
during my tenure as the Chief Prosecutor for the military commissions at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  We had similar perspectives on many issues, and 
we still confer on detainee matters.  I concur with the views expressed in his 
essay.1  I write to address two issues Professor McNeal identified and com-
ment on how they affect the military commissions.  First, I examine the 
case of the Nazi saboteurs—captured, tried, and executed in the span of 
seven weeks in 1942—and its influence on the decision in 2001 to resurrect 
military commissions.  Second, I assess the conflicting statutory provisions 
in the Military Commissions Act and the impact on full, fair, and open tri-
als. 
I. ATTEMPTING TO REPEAT HISTORY 
Professor McNeal argues that the administration chose military com-
missions to protect information collected for intelligence (intel) purposes 
from disclosure.  Safeguarding intel, particularly the sources and methods 
used to acquire information, was a key factor, but I believe the decision had 
a broader basis heavily influenced by a precedent-setting trial in 1942 that 
became the template for the President‘s Military Order of November 13, 
2001.2 
Shortly after midnight the morning of June 13, 1942, four men left a 
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They wore military uniforms in hopes that if captured during the landing 
they would receive prisoner of war treatment.  Four days later, at Ponte Ve-
dra Beach near Jacksonville, Florida, another group of four men did the 
same.  The eight men infiltrated the United States to execute a plan devel-
oped by the German High Command at the insistence of Adolph Hitler to 
attack factories, bridges, rail yards, and utilities to disrupt wartime produc-
tion, intimidate the American public, and weaken the will to fight.  The men 
were selected because they had lived in the United States before and were 
unlikely to attract attention as they moved about the country committing sa-
botage. 
Mission success was in jeopardy from the start.  The first team that 
landed in New York encountered a Coast Guardsman walking his nightly 
patrol along the beach.  The leader of the four-man team, George Dasch, 
lived in the United States for nearly two decades, was married to an Ameri-
can, and served in the U.S. Army before returning to Germany.  He spoke 
nearly flawless American English.  Dasch told Seaman Second Class John 
Cullen that he did not want to kill him, and he offered Cullen $260 to forget 
what he had seen.  Cullen was unarmed and outnumbered, so he took the 
money, returned to the Coast Guard station, and reported the encounter.  A 
group of armed Coast Guardsmen returned to the beach, too late to capture 
Dasch‘s team, but in time to smell diesel fuel, hear the rumble of an engine 
in the distance, and see the superstructure of a submarine heading out to 
sea.  Similarly, within hours of the landing near Jacksonville fishermen dis-
covered explosives and uniforms the saboteurs tried to hide in the sand on 
the beach.  The effort to sneak the saboteurs ashore unnoticed was unsuc-
cessful. 
But the event that doomed the effort to failure was the decision by 
George Dasch, with the acquiescence of his travel partner Ernest Burger, to 
abandon the plan and report it to the FBI.  Dasch encountered skepticism 
when he telephoned the FBI in New York City.  He traveled to Washington 
a few days later expecting a hero‘s welcome and a face-to-face meeting 
with J. Edgar Hoover, but encountered more doubters.  It was not until he 
dumped $82,000 in cash onto a table at FBI headquarters the morning of 
June 19 that he was taken seriously.  Dasch prepared a 254 page single-
spaced typewritten statement outlining the plan.  The eight saboteurs were 
all in custody and had confessed by June 27. 
President Roosevelt debated what to do with the saboteurs.  A trial in 
the civilian courts was rejected because the group had committed no acts of 
sabotage and likely faced charges of conspiracy to commit sabotage and a 
maximum sentence of confinement for three years.  Roosevelt told Attorney 
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General Francis Biddle that he was considering a court-martial where the 
death penalty was available, but like a civilian court, a court-martial re-
quired proof beyond a reasonable doubt and employed restrictive rules of 
evidence and procedure.  Provost Marshall General Oscar Cox proposed a 
military commission, an idea that Secretary of War Henry Stimson sup-
ported despite the concerns of some in the Justice Department over holding 
a military commission when civilian courts were functioning.4  President 
Roosevelt concurred with Cox and Stimson, and he signed an order on July 
2 naming the members of the military commission (in essence, the judge 
and jurors), the prosecutors, and the defense counsel.  The order directed 
that evidence having probative value to a reasonable man would be admit-
ted and the record of trial would be sent directly to the President when the 
trial ended. 
Attorney General Biddle and The Judge Advocate General of the Ar-
my, Major General Myron Cramer, were the lead prosecutors.5  Colonel 
Kenneth Royall spearheaded the defense.6  The military commission assem-
bled on July 8, 1942, in Room 5235 at the Justice Building in Washington, 
a few blocks from the White House, the Capitol, and the Supreme Court.  
Everyone except the accused was sworn to secrecy and no one else was al-
lowed in the room.  Despite the President‘s order prohibiting the federal 
courts from considering an action by anyone charged with a law of war vi-
olation before a military tribunal, Royall filed an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus with the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia 
challenging the constitutionality of the military commission.  The applica-
tion was denied the evening of July 28, citing the President‘s order.7 
In the interim, Royall lobbied members of the Supreme Court, who 
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  See FISHER, supra note 3, at 12.  The district court judge, without explanation, ―did not consider 
Ex Parte Milligan ‗controlling in the circumstances of this petitioner.‘‖  Id. (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 47 
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ably, the Supreme Court held oral arguments sixteen hours after the District 
Court denied the application, beginning around noon on July 29 and contin-
uing on July 30, for a total of nine hours of arguments.8  Chief Justice Har-
lan Fiske Stone announced the Court‘s unanimous decision orally at noon 
on July 31.  The Court upheld the military commission.  On August 3, the 
military commission found all eight men guilty and sentenced them to 
death.  The President reviewed the 3,000 page trial transcript the next day 
and approved death sentences for six of the eight men.  He commuted the 
death sentences for Dasch and Burger, and they were deported to Germany 
years later.  The six condemned men died in the electric chair at the District 
of Columbia Jail on August 8, 1942 and were buried in unmarked graves on 
government property near the Anacostia River.  The Court‘s opinion, Ex 
Parte Quirin,9 proved to be a challenge to write and was not released until 
October 29, twelve weeks after the executions.  In total, it took only seven 
weeks for the President to create and convene a military commission, for 
prosecutors and defense counsel to prepare their cases, to litigate a joint tri-
al for eight men, for an appeal to the district court to be filed and denied, for 
the Supreme Court to hear oral arguments and render a decision, and for six 
men to be executed and buried.10  
I agree with Professor McNeal that protecting intel was a factor in the 
decision to revive the dormant military commission option, but it was not 
the sole factor.  The history of the Nazi saboteurs was to some a precedent 
that proved that military commissions were swift, secret, and successful, 
and that the judicial branch would exhibit fawning obeisance to the Presi-
dent on matters of national security.  The 1942 trial became the template for 
the plan to prosecute detainees in the global war on terrorism.11  Combine 
that template with the view that detainees are unlawful enemy combatants 
exempt from Geneva Convention protections, the internationally accepted 
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belief that Guantánamo Bay was a law-free zone beyond the reach of the 
courts, and a desire to maximize executive authority, and the roadmap leads 
to where we are today.  In other words, it was assumed that we could detain 
and exploit enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay for as long as we 
wanted.  We could then prosecute them in military commissions that would 
be swift, secret, and successful.  It would all be free of outside interference, 
and it would bolster executive power.  Safeguarding intel was securely 
within that circle. 
Rather than relying on Quirin, the decisionmakers should have consi-
dered how Roosevelt responded when a chance to repeat the process arose a 
few years later.  In late November 1944, a German submarine dropped two 
would-be saboteurs off along the coast of Maine, and by the end of the year 
both men were in FBI custody.  One would assume that if the prosecution 
of the saboteurs in 1942 was a precedent-setting success President Roose-
velt would simply repeat the process, and the Attorney General and Army 
Judge Advocate General advocated for exactly that.12  Secretary of War 
Stimson, however, persuaded the President that repeating the process might 
have adverse consequences.  Stimson believed an extraordinary trial process 
under the direction and control of very senior government officials like 
Biddle and Cramer would cause excessive publicity and set a precedent that 
might encourage the Germans to use extraordinary measures against Amer-
ican prisoners of war.13 
Roosevelt sided with Stimson and authorized a military commission 
that differed in material respects from the 1942 trial.  The military commis-
sion was convened, and rather than the President, Major General Thomas 
Terry—an active duty military officer and Commander of the Second Ser-
vices Command—selected the members and counsel.14  The trial was held 
on a military post, Fort Jay, on Governors Island, New York, rather than in 
the Justice Building in Washington.  Biddle and Cramer were not allowed 
to prosecute, despite their desire to do so.15  And when the trial ended, the 
record of trial went through the normal post-trial review process set out in 
the Articles of War, the same as a court-martial, rather than directly to the 
President.  There were, however, some similarities to 1942: the military 
commission proceedings were closed to the public, and the accused were 
found guilty and sentenced to death.16  Roosevelt died in April 1945 not 
long before the death sentences were to be carried out and while the case 
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sentences to confinement for life and later reduced them to set periods of 
confinement.17 
Whether it was because World War II ended shortly after the trial or 
because more ordinary processes that Stimson advocated were used, the 
second trial generated far less attention than the first, and today it is virtual-
ly forgotten.  Regardless, Stimson‘s concerns merit consideration today.  If 
we employ and condone extraordinary measures, we weaken our moral au-
thority to condemn others when they do the same.  Lloyd Cutler, the young-
est of the prosecutors in the 1942 trial, published an article in December 
2001, citing lessons learned six decades earlier.  Cutler suggested the ad-
ministration allow the accused access to the federal courts, minimize secret 
proceedings as much as possible, and ensure that each accused has compe-
tent and conflict-free representation by his counsel of choice.  Cutler con-
cluded, ―In a very real sense, it is the American legal system, not just al 
Qaeda‘s leaders, that [will] be on trial.‖18 
Some senior officials portray the current military commissions as ordi-
nary processes, but the claim rings hollow.  Brigadier General Thomas 
Hartmann, the Legal Advisor to the Convening Authority, at a Pentagon 
press conference in February 2008 announcing charges against the 9/11 de-
tainees, said: ―These processes that we have before the military commis-
sions in many ways parallel the military justice system which, I think, is 
very well regarded by the defense community as giving tremendous rights 
to [defendants].‖19  He told Newsweek: 
[T]he protections provided to these people, to these accused, are very, very 
similar to the protections that would be provided to me in connection with a 
military court-martial.  That‘s a fundamentally important thing, to say that 
you‘re giving essentially the same kinds of protections to people accused in 
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Roles, WASH. POST, May 9, 2005, at A1.  
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  Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann, Legal Advisor to the Convening Auth. for the Office of Military 
Comm‘ns, Dept. of Def. News Briefing with Brig. Gen. Hartmann from the Pentagon (Feb. 11, 2008) 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=414 (link). 
20
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sions, NEWSWEEK.COM, Jun. 2, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/139664/output (link).  Hartmann 
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But saying it is essentially the same as the widely respected court-martial 
system does not make it so.21  On July 11, 2008, for example, 375 European 
officials filed a friend-of-the-court brief with the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia in the Hamdan case arguing the procedures for the 
military commissions ―are clearly at odds with the most basic norms of fair 
trial and due process.‖22  These deficiencies set military commissions apart 
from the American military justice system. 
If a military commission is, as Brigadier General Hartmann claims, es-
sentially an ordinary court-martial, why is an extraordinary process even 
necessary?  The Roosevelt administration learned from its experience with 
the saboteurs in 1942 and chose not to follow the same course again in 
1945.  It has been nearly seven years since the President authorized military 
commissions and the results, or lack thereof, speak for themselves.  Lloyd 
Cutler‘s prediction in December 2001 that military commissions would be 
as much a trial of the American legal system as a trial of al Qaeda proved 
accurate.  I doubt he would like the verdict. 
II. MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND COURTS-MARTIAL ARE NOT TWO 
SIDES OF THE SAME COIN 
Professor McNeal accurately describes the tension created by portions 
of the Military Commissions Act (MCA)23 that allow the Secretary of De-
fense, or any officer or official of the United States that he designates, to 
send a case to a military commission,24 and prohibit any person from at-
tempting to coerce or by any unauthorized means influence a prosecutor‘s 
exercise of professional judgment.25  These provisions are similar to ones in 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that allow the President, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the service to which the accused be-
longs, and a number of different commanding officers to send a case to a 
general court-martial.26  The UCMJ also contains a prohibition on exerting 
                                                                                                                           
repeated the claim in an ABC World News interview on the eve of the Hamdan trial.  ABC News: The 
Trial of Salim Hamdan (ABC television broadcast Jul. 20, 2008), available at 
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  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered 
sections of 10, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.) (link). 
24
  Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948h. 
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  Id. § 949b(a)(2)(C). 
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  The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2008). 
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unlawful influence, although it lacks the MCA‘s extra protection for a pros-
ecutor‘s exercise of professional judgment.27 
The reason for the MCA‘s special protection for the exercise of profes-
sional judgment is as Professor McNeal describes.28  Some from outside the 
prosecution took great interest in our efforts, to put it charitably, after the 
high value detainees were transferred to the Department of Defense from 
the Central Intelligence Agency in September 2006.  A short time later, I 
asked Senators Lindsey Graham and John McCain to add some extra pro-
tection to the MCA to insulate the prosecution from external interference.  
The importance of this protection was tested in the first contested trial.  Sa-
lim Hamdan‘s counsel moved to dismiss the charges because of undue in-
fluence over the prosecution by Brigadier General Hartmann.29  The 
Military Judge, Navy Captain Keith Allred, found that Hartmann tread too 
far into the prosecution function and violated the ban on unlawful influence, 
but instead of dismissing charges he disqualified Hartmann from further in-
volvement in the case.30  In his ruling, Judge Allred said: 
The Commission finds that Congress had the intent to protect military com-
mission participants from unlawful influence, and specifically from political 
influence, and that its purpose in doing so was to protect the integrity of the 
proceedings and enhance their reputation in the public view.  The Commission 
generally accepts the military law of command influence as an appropriate 
model for decisions under the comparable provisions of the MCA.  But be-
cause Congress took special steps in the MCA to protect the prosecutors from 
unlawful influence, the general military model, in which the SJA [an organiza-
tion‘s senior attorney] properly supervises and directs the prosecution, military 
law‘s general acceptance of SJA supervision of trial counsel must be mod-
erated somewhat to prevent that supervision from becoming not merely intru-
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  See Defense Motion to Dismiss the Charges and Specifications for Unlawful Influence, United 
States v. Hamdan, D-026 (Military Comm‘n, Mar. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.nimj.com/documents/UCI%20Motion%20with%20Attachments.pdf (link). 
30
  See Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Unlawful Influence) at 10–12, United States v. Hamdan, D-
026 (Military Comm‘n, May 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2008/D026.pdf (link). 
31
  Id. at 9–10.  On August 14, 2008, a different military judge presiding over the case of Mo-
hammed Jawad disqualified Brigadier General Hartmann for similar reasons.  See Mike Melia, Pentagon 
Official Removed from 2nd Gitmo Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 14, 2008; Carol Rosenberg, Judge 
Bans General from Guantánamo Trial Role, MIAMIHERALD.COM, Aug. 14, 2008, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/guantanamo/story/642000.html (link).  On September 4, 
2008, a third judge disqualified him from involvement in another case.  Despite being disqualified three 
times for having compromised his objectivity by becoming too involved with the prosecution, as of Sep-
tember, Brigadier General Hartmann was still Legal Advisor to the Convening Authority and actively 
engaged in moving military commission cases to trial.  Carol Rosenberg, Replace Guantánamo Lawyer, 
ex-Bush Official Urges, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 8, 2008, at C8, available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-guantanamosep07,0,1735370.story (link).  A De-
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I did not anticipate a problem from within the Office of Military 
Commissions when I asked for added protection from undue influence.  At 
that time, in September 2006, the Convening Authority was Major General 
(retired) John Altenburg32 and his Legal Advisor was Brigadier General 
Thomas Hemingway.33  These two career military officers had over sixty 
years of active duty military service between them, including service at the 
most senior levels of the Army and Air Force JAG Corps.  They maintained 
their detachment from both the prosecution and defense and went to great 
lengths to avoid even the appearance of partiality.  For example, when I ar-
rived in late 2005, the prosecution occupied a suite of offices adjacent to the 
Convening Authority in a building near the Pentagon.  A common doorway, 
normally propped open, connected our offices, allowing prosecutors and 
members of the Convening Authority‘s staff to mingle freely.  To avoid any 
perception that we were too close, Altenburg and Hemingway had a door 
with a Pentagon monitored alarm installed, physically separating the prose-
cutors and the Convening Authority‘s staff. 
Altenburg and Hemingway were replaced by Susan Crawford and 
Hartmann, respectively.34  Susan Crawford never served a day in a military 
uniform, yet as the Convening Authority she sits atop the military commis-
sion hierarchy.35  Brigadier General Hartmann served as an active duty 
judge advocate for less than eight years before leaving in 1991 to enter the 
Air Force Reserve and pursue a private sector career.36  Until July 2007 
when he became the Legal Advisor to Crawford, Hartmann was the general 
counsel of MXenergy, a Stamford, Connecticut company with some De-
fense Department contracts.37 
                                                                                                                           
fense Department spokesperson said Hartmann ―remains focused on doing his job as the Legal Adviser 
to the Convening Authority and he will continue to do it.‖  Id. 
32
  See Biography of John D. Altenburg, Jr., Greenberg Traurig, 
http://www.gtlaw.com/People/JohnDAltenburgJr (link). 
33
  See Biography of Brigadier General Hemingway, United States Air Force, 
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7760 (link). 
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  See Press Release, Dept. of Def., Seasoned Judge Tapped Head Detainee Trials (Feb. 7, 2007), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=10493 (discussing Susan 
Crawford‘s appointment as Convening Authority) (link); Brigadier General Hartman, United States Air 
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partment of the Army from 1983 to 1989 in the Reagan-Bush administration.  In November 1989, Presi-
dent George H.W. Bush nominated her to be DoD Inspector General under Secretary of Defense (now 
Vice President) Richard Cheney.  John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17781 (link). 
36
  See United States Air Force Biography of Brigadier General Thomas W. Hartmann, 
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=10078 (link). 
37
  Hartmann became MXenergy‘s general counsel in January 2005.  See MXenergy Services, Inc., 
Registration Statement for Securities to Be Issued in Business Combination Transactions (Form S-4/A), 
at 90 (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/2007/01/17/0001047469-07-
000232/Section22.asp (link).  The ―Active Parties List‖ in New York State Department of Public Ser-
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Military justice is unique, with some features that are analogous and 
others totally foreign to the civilian justice system.  It is designed to help 
military commanders maintain mission readiness and unit discipline.  As 
some experienced military justice commentators said: 
By its very nature, the military criminal legal system operates in an awkward 
fashion.  Commanders are given extensive responsibilities and powers in order 
to make it work.  Yet, commanders who stray from the system‘s clear con-
straints run the risk of affecting the fairness of individual trials and subverting 
the legitimacy of the entire system.38 
It is the military justice system‘s focus on readiness rather than civilian sys-
tem‘s focus on retribution that justifies military justice operating in such 
―an awkward fashion.‖ 
From 2001 through 2007, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps convened more than 50,000 courts-martial.39  Despite the fact that the 
UCMJ, like the MCA, allows designated civilian officials to be convening 
authorities, to the best of my knowledge not one court-martial was con-
vened by a civilian, which raises the question: if military commissions are 
based on courts-martial, why are they alone convened by a civilian political 
appointee rather than a military commanding officer? 
If these truly are military commissions intended to dispense military 
justice then this is a military mission that ought to be performed by the mili-
tary.  President Roosevelt chose to appoint a military commanding officer 
as the convening authority when he had a second chance, and he allowed 
the case to proceed through the normal military appellate review process af-
terwards.  His handling of the saboteurs in 1945 is a better model for a mili-
tary commission than the more famous 1942 case.  Courts-martial 
convening authorities—career military officers—understand that unlawful 
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lists Thomas W. Hartmann as the party of record for MXenergy as of July 7, 2008.  See Active Parties 
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at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/0/ 
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secured its first Department of Defense contract in May 2007.  See Contracts to MXenergy, Inc. (FY 
2000–2008), USASpending.gov, 
http://www.usaspending.gov/fpds/fpds.php?company_name=MXenergy&sortby=r&detail=0&datype=T
&reptype=r&database=fpds&fiscal_year=&submit=GO (link).  The Department of Defense awarded 
MXenergy another contract valued at $28 million in June 2008.  Press Release, Dept. of Def., Contracts 
(June 26, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3806 (link). 
38
  Frederic I. Lederer and Barbara Hundley Zeliff, Needed, an Independent Military Judiciary: A 
Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in EVOLVING MILITARY JUSTICE 27, 38 (Fidell 
& Sullivan ed., Naval Institute Press, 2002). 
39
  The total comes from data reported annually by each service and published in the Annual Reports 
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influence is, as Chief Judge Robinson O. Everett said years ago, ―the mortal 
enemy of military justice.‖40  Generals Altenburg and Hemingway unders-
tood that and ensured that prosecution and convening authority functions 
remained separate to avoid too close a relationship casting doubt on the le-
gitimacy of the process.  Replacing their sixty-plus years of active duty mil-
itary legal experience with a career political appointee having no prior 
military service and a Reserve attorney from a company doing business 
with the Defense Department, in my view, indicates military commissions 
are not as military as the wording of the title suggests.41 
CONCLUSION 
My comments are limited to two aspects of military commissions, but 
there are other aspects to consider.42  Additionally, important questions 
about the appropriate standard of review for detainees held as unlawful 
combatants who will not face war crimes charges, and proper techniques for 
obtaining intelligence and evidence exceed the scope of this Essay.  With an 
election on the horizon and a new administration soon to take responsibility 
for Guantánamo Bay and the war on terrorism, debate on these questions 
will lead to a new course of action and perhaps begin to restore our reputa-
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